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v0.100.2 prep #154
v0.100.2 prep #154
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Codecov Report
@@ Coverage Diff @@
## rel-0.100 #154 +/- ##
=============================================
+ Coverage 94.17% 94.59% +0.42%
=============================================
Files 14 13 -1
Lines 2505 2573 +68
=============================================
+ Hits 2359 2434 +75
+ Misses 146 139 -7
... and 2 files with indirect coverage changes 📣 We’re building smart automated test selection to slash your CI/CD build times. Learn more |
This is caused by adding the new signature count argument to the v0.100 validation APIs:
We can either ignore this clippy finding, or backport the |
Pathbuilding complexity can be quadratic, particularly when the set of intermediates all have subjects matching a trust anchor. In these cases we need to bound the number of expensive signature validation operations that are performed to avoid a DoS on CPU usage. This commit implements a simple maximum signature check limit inspired by the approach taken in the Golang x509 package. No more than 100 signatures will be evaluated while pathbuilding. This limit works in practice for Go when processing real world certificate chains and so should be appropriate for our use case as well.
Do we want to give this an MSRV bump? |
Yes just working out what the minimum bump possible is :( |
This is the minimum of once_cell 1.18.0 (selected via ring -> web-sys -> wasm-bindgen -> wasm-bindgen-macro -> wasm-bindgen-macro-support -> wasm-bindgen-backend -> once_cell).
0.100.2 release prep
This branch targets a base of
rel-0.100
to prepare a point release in the v0.100.x series.Proposed release notes
verify_cert: enforce maximum number of signatures.
Pathbuilding complexity can be quadratic, particularly when the set of intermediates all have subjects matching a trust anchor. In these cases we need to bound the number of expensive signature validation operations that are performed to avoid a DoS on CPU usage.
This commit implements a simple maximum signature check limit inspired by the approach taken in the Golang x509 package. No more than 100 signatures will be evaluated while pathbuilding. This limit works in practice for Go when processing real world certificate chains and so should be appropriate for our use case as well.
Cargo: version 0.100.1 -> 0.100.2
Bumps the Cargo version.