Fix ASN.1 issues in PKCS#7 and S/MIME signing

[facutuesca]

This PR fixes two issues with the ASN.1 generated when signing using PKCS#7:

First issue

The current implementation defines the SMIMECapabilities attribute so that its value is a SEQUENCE of all the algorithm OIDs that are supported. This is what the ASN.1 currently looks like for a signed message using cryptography:

  U.P.SEQUENCE {
     U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 (S/MIME capabilities)
     U.P.SET {
        U.P.SEQUENCE {
           U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 (aes256-CBC-PAD)
           U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 (aes192-CBC-PAD)
           U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 (aes128-CBC-PAD)
        }
     }
  }

However, the S/MIME v3 spec (RFC 2633) specifies that each algorithm should be specified in its own SEQUENCE:

SMIMECapabilities ::= SEQUENCE OF SMIMECapability

SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
   capabilityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   parameters ANY DEFINED BY capabilityID OPTIONAL }

(RFC 2633, Appendix A)

The spec matches what OpenSSL outputs (using openssl smime -sign):

  U.P.SEQUENCE {
     U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 (S/MIME capabilities)
     U.P.SET {
        U.P.SEQUENCE {
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 (aes256-CBC-PAD)
           }
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 (aes192-CBC-PAD)
           }
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 (aes128-CBC-PAD)
           }
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.3.7 (id_des_EDE3_CBC)
           }
          .....

This PR changes the implementation so that each algorithm is inside its own SEQUENCE. After the changes in this PR, the ASN.1 output looks like:

  U.P.SEQUENCE {
     U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 (S/MIME capabilities)
     U.P.SET {
        U.P.SEQUENCE {
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 (aes256-CBC-PAD)
           }
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 (aes192-CBC-PAD)
           }
           U.P.SEQUENCE {
              U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 (aes128-CBC-PAD)
           }
        }
     }
  }

Second issue

There is an issue with the RSA OID used for signing PKCS#7/SMIME, in the SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier field.

The current implementation computes the algorithm identifier used in the digest_encryption_algorithm PKCS#7 field
(or SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier in S/MIME) based on both the algorithm used to sign (e.g. RSA) and the digest algorithm (e.g. SHA512).

This is correct for ECDSA signatures, where the OIDs used include the digest algorithm (e.g: ecdsa-with-SHA512). However, due to historical reasons, when signing with RSA the OID specified should be the one
corresponding to just RSA ("1.2.840.113549.1.1.1" rsaEncryption), rather than OIDs which also include the digest algorithm (such as "1.2.840.113549.1.1.13" sha512WithRSAEncryption).

This means that the logic to compute the algorithm identifier is the same except when signing with RSA, in which case the OID will always be rsaEncryption. This is consistent with the OpenSSL implementation, and the RFCs that define PKCS#7 and S/MIME.

See RFC 3851 (section 2.2), and RFC 3370 (section 3.2) for more details.

[alex]

Haven't re-reviewed the RFC, but we should add a test for this.

[alex]

Suggested change

	params: common::AlgorithmParameters::Rsa(None),
	params: common::AlgorithmParameters::Rsa(Some(())),

[facutuesca]

fixed

[alex]

Suggested change

	let has_pss_padding = !rsa_padding.is_none() && rsa_padding.is_instance(types::PSS.get(py)?)?;
	let has_pss_padding = rsa_padding.is_instance(types::PSS.get(py)?)?;

I don't think the is_none() check is required? None isn't an instance of PSS :-)

[facutuesca]

Ah, I got that code from

cryptography/src/rust/src/x509/sign.rs

Lines 135 to 137 in 50ea0fa

	// If this is RSA-PSS we need to compute the signature algorithm from the
	// parameters provided in rsa_padding.
	if !rsa_padding.is_none() && rsa_padding.is_instance(types::PSS.get(py)?)? {

. Should I remove it from there as well?

[alex]

Probably that should be fixed, but no need to do it in this PR.

[facutuesca]

done

[facutuesca]

@alex I also added an item to the CHANGELOG